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Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa promised to enhance democracy by abandoning neoliber-
alism, using the state to bring social justice, and constitution making to transform the relationships between 
the state and society. They invoked the supremacy of constituent power over the existing institutional ar-
rangements of constituted power. They used votes to take away power from traditional politicians and to cre-
ate new hegemonic power blocks. They had the fortune to govern under a commodity and mineral resource 
boom that gave them the resources to reduce poverty, increase the presence of the state in the national territo-
ry, and to have an anti-imperialist foreign policy. 
Some scholars argued that these experiments were innovative attempts to create not only post-neoliberal 
economies but also post-liberal political arrangements (Wolff 2016). Others contended that these projects 
strongly resembled past populist experiences that brought the inclusion of excluded sectors of the population 
at the cost of pluralism, and the restrictions of the rights of association and information (de la Torre 2010, 
Burbano de Lara 2019).      
The article explores the effects of populist polarization in creating strong and long-lasting institutions 
based on the rule of law. It focuses on politics and not on the political economy of populism or of natural re-
source extraction. The first section briefly explains how we understand the contested notions of populism 
and the rule of law. The second focuses on the paradigmatic case of Juan Perón’s first two administrations 
(1946-1956) to explore the ambiguous legacies of populist inclusion for the creation of long-lasting demo-
cratic institutions. Argentineans attained the right to vote in free elections, the franchise was dramatically in-
creased, and they also obtained social rights. Civil rights, however, were given on the condition of accepting 
the authority of the leader. Those who challenged Perón from the right or the left were branded as enemies of 
the leader, the people, and the nation. Without institutional channels the opposition called the military to oust 
Perón, and the military dictatorship aimed to get rid of Peronism. From the 1930s to the 70s in Argentina, as 
in most of Latin America, politics oscillated between populist administrations, weak and unstable liberal de-
mocracies, and military interventions and regimes.  
The third section focuses on how Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa appealed to the unbound-
ed will of the people to convene participatory constituent assemblies. New constitutions expanded rights, 
concentrated power in the executive, reduced horizontal accountability, and created plebiscitary democra-
cies. Yet the process of constitution making varied in these nations. Whereas in Bolivia the government was 
forced to negotiate with the opposition, in Venezuela and Ecuador charismatic presidents led the process of 
writing the new constitution often marginalizing the opposition. The chapter then studies processes of politi-
cal polarization provoked by populists and the responses of their adversaries. It focuses on how populist and 
their foes understood democracy during the failed coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002, and in the events that 
led to the overthrow of Evo Morales in 2019. Whereas Chávez and Morales claimed that they were the vic-
tims of coups, their foes argued that they were defending democracy. In these events polarized citizens used 
the term democracy to often justify undemocratic actions.  
The last section focuses on Ecuador’s post-populist succession. Different from Evo Morales who was 
ousted by a coup, or Nicolás Maduro who killed democracy, Lenín Moreno, who was Correa’s former vice-
president, abandoned populism, ditched his mentor, and used a referendum to clean the state and political in-
stitutions from Correa’s allies. Appealing to the people directly, his administration assumed exceptional 
powers to name new authorities of control and accountability. His institutional reforms however might not 
last because they were based on the exclusion of Correa and his followers. The conclusion explores the rea-





sons why actors continue to use laws instrumentally making it difficult to create long-lasting institutional ar-
rangements based on the rule of law, and hence on the possibility of deepening democracy. 
 
 
2. Populism and the Rule of law 
 
Populism and the rule of law are highly contentious concepts. Three handbooks of populism illustrate 
how, despite calls for using a universal definition, scholars continue to draw on different understandings of 
what populism is, or simply develop their own (Heinisch, Holtz Bacha and Mazzoleni 2017; Rovira Kalt-
watzer, Taggart, Ochoa, and Ostiguy 2017; de la Torre 2019).  Controversies around definitions of populism 
are inevitable as it is not just a category used by scholars. Populism is what German scholars consider a basic 
concept that is deployed in public debates. As such it does not carry a single indisputable meaning, and a va-
riety of conflicting constituencies passionately struggle to make their definitions “authoritative and compel-
ling” (Baehr 2008: 12).  
Drawing on the vast literature on populism and our ongoing research we have developed a synthetic ideal 
type of populism as encompassing these traits: populists polarize citizens into friend and enemy, use a part 
pro parte dynamic, and construct a leader as the embodiment of the people. Yet populist seeking power are 
not the same as populist governments or populist regimes.  
Populists do not face political rivals with whom one could disagree, they confront existential enemies. 
When seeking office their antagonists are broadly casted as the establishment (Urbinati 2019). Once in pow-
er their enemies become particular political, economic, and cultural elites that supposedly hold real power. 
Populists differ on whom they construct as their enemies. Rightwing populist often face two types of ene-
mies: cosmopolitan elites above, and dependents of color bellow. They use racist tropes to cast populations 
of colonial origin not only as inferior but as inherently culturally different and inassimilable. If the right po-
liticized fears to the danger of contamination of culture, religion, and race, the left focuses on the angers and 
resentments produce by socioeconomic and political exclusions, and by systemic inequalities. They politicize 
anger, indignation, resentment, and envy to cast the elites as servants of imperialism and the IMF. 
Populists do not aim to give power back to all the population. They do not appeal to Rousseau’ general 
will either. They aim to empower only a section of the population, those excluded that represent the right and 
truthful people. For populism to be successful it needs a leader, otherwise it remains at the margins of the po-
litical system (Urbinati 2019). A leader is built as the embodiment or personification of the right people. 
Populist inclusion is on the condition of accepting the guidance of the leader.  
Populists attempting to get to power, populist in office, and populist regimes are not the same. When chal-
lenging power populists politicize issues that other politicians ignore to see or do not address. Once in office 
they follow surprisingly similar playbooks: (1) Capturing the referees such as the judicial system, law en-
forcement, intelligence agencies, tax authorities, regulatory agencies, and institutions in charge of horizontal 
accountability. (2) Using the law instrumentally to try to make critics quiet, and to regulate the activities of 
organizations of civil society. (3) Changing the rules of the game by reforming the constitution and changing 
electoral rules. (4) Fabricating or taking advantage of crises to concentrate power and crack down the opposi-
tion (Levitsky and Ziblat 2018: 78-96). 
When populists are able to change constitutions, to regulate the public sphere, and control civil society 
they become regimes. These are based on the predominance of the executive over other branches of power, 
and by the charismatic leader’s control of the state apparatus. Populist regimes are legitimized by a combina-




tion of the democratic commitment to elections as the only legal tool to elect and remove politicians with 
undemocratic views of political rivals as enemies, and conceptions of the people as unitary actors.  
According to Guillermo O’Donnell (1999: 321) democracy is not just a political regime, it is also a mode 
of “relationship between state and citizens, and among citizens themselves, under a kind of rule of law that, 
in addition to political citizenship, upholds civil citizenship and a full network of accountability”. The rule of 
law sustains political freedoms and guarantees the civil rights of the whole population. It “establishes net-
works of responsibility and accountability that entails that all agents, public and private, including the high-
est placed officials of the regime, are subject to the appropriate, legally established controls of the lawfulness 
of their acts” (Ibid.: 318). Democracy, O’Donnell sustains, is not a static regime but a moving horizon where 
the acquisition of rights triggers new demands, and the acquired rights need to be protected and strengthened.  
As we will show in the paper in Latin America political rights are often effective, whereas civil rights that 
support the pluralism and diversity of society are weak or absent. Moreover, elites can violate formal rules 
and laws without sanctions. The rich evade paying taxes, and politicians use laws at will to marginalize rivals 
and to favor their friends. The continuous low enforcement of laws or the “un-rule of law” leads to institu-
tional weakness and hence to the continuous breakdown and replacement of institutions, laws, and constitu-
tions (Levistky and Murillo 2009). 
 
 
3. Populist Incorporation: the Legacies of the Past 
 
Populism emerged in Latin America in the 1930s when the oligarchical order entered into crises, and 
common people demanded political participation rebelling against electoral fraud, as well as against class 
and ethnic exclusions. The Latin American hierarchical pattern of capitalist development is based on highly 
segmented labor markets. There is a small formal sector of the economy with limited access to social securi-
ty, stable work and benefits, and a large sector of the population is employed in the informal sector with “un-
certain hours, short-term contracts, and restricted access to social programs” (Roberts 2019: 651). Not sur-
prisingly, Latin America is one of the most unequal regions of the world, and the poor, as Guillermo 
O’Donnell (1999) wrote, are not only materially deprived but they are equally legally dispossessed. The legal 
system functions and is perceived as a tool of class domination and exploitation. Common people know that 
whereas the rich and powerful, when convenient, could escape from the law, the disadvantaged are at the 
mercy of the agents of the law. The state was weak and unable to protect the poor from the powerful and 
from the abuses of state officials. 
The first wave of populist leaders known as classical populists, like Juan Perón in Argentina, fought 
against electoral fraud and expanded the franchise. Even tough male universal suffrage existed since 1912, 
women were excluded and in the 1930s elites stayed in power using electoral fraud. Under Perón elections 
were clean, and women were given the right to vote in 1947. As a result, voter turnout under Peron´s first 
two terms in office dramatically grew from 18 percent of the population in 1946 to 50 percent in 1955 
(Schamis 2013: 155). Populism was also understood as the redistribution of material resources. Perón’s gov-
ernment reallocated wealth and increased the share of wages of the national GDP from 37 in 1946 to 47 per-
cent in 1955. Workers won labor rights and received other material benefits such as access to social and 
medical services, and paid vacations (Plotkin 2010: 273).  
The populist pact of domination was based on accepting the unquestionable wisdom of the leader and his 
superior capacity to liberate and protect the people. Organizations of civil society were not autonomous or 
independent from the leader. Because for populist’s politics is based on antagonistic confrontations against 





enemies, they have difficulties accepting dissent, pluralism, and a critical public sphere. Perón’s government 
expropriated newspapers La Prensa, and La Nueva Provincia, and created a chain of radio stations and news-
papers. His propaganda machinery “published more than 2.5 million pamphlets of various types and more 
than 3 million posters, in addition to producing movies and other propaganda materials” (Plotkin 2003: 31).  
Perón saw rivals as enemies and claimed that when political adversaries became “enemies of the nation”, 
they were not longer “gentlemen that one should fight fairly but snakes that one can kill in any way” 
(Finchelstein 2014: 86).  
Perón replaced the constitution with a Peronist or Justicialist Charter in 1950. Instead of following estab-
lished amendment procedures, the government used a plebiscitarian strategy that resulted in an unbound 
conventional assembly, which imposed the views of Perón and his cadres. Enrique Peruzzotti (2019: 12) ar-
gues that Perón’s constitution dismantled the “representative instances of political intermediation: parliament 
and the public sphere”. The legislature was weakened as the presidency gained power, and the public sphere 
was regulated and supervised by the state.  
Without democratic spaces, the opposition conspired with the military and Perón was ousted in 1955. The 
aim of the military junta was to de-Peronise Argentina, and even mentioning the word Perón became a crime. 
Worker’s and other followers of Perón resisted and kept alive his memory (James 1988), and democracy be-
came a game of permanent confrontation between Peronists and their enemies.  
Populist Constitution Making and Discriminatory Legalism 
Constitution making is not new in Latin America. It has been used in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela as 
instruments to enact social and political change, and to dismantle existing institutions seen as exclusionary. 
Since independence Bolivia had 16 constitutions, Ecuador 20, and Venezuela 26. What was new about the 
constitution making cycle in the late 1990s and early 2000s is that radical populists used participatory consti-
tution making to bring re-foundational change. This meant that leftist populist abandoned the old revolution-
ary strategy of armed struggle and used constitutional change with the aim to deepen and radicalize democ-
racy.  
Social movements and intellectuals in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador demanded constitutional assem-
blies to get rid of neoliberal elites, to improve the quality of democracy, and to include the excluded. Inspired 
by the work of Antonio Negri, whose book Constituent Power Chávez claimed to have read over and over 
again, he invoked the constituent power of the people to refound his nation (Azellini 2010: 113). Constituent 
power was understood as a revolutionary force that ought to be permanently activated to revamp all the cor-
rupt political institutions that served the interests of foreign powers and local elites. Bolivia under Morales 
and Ecuador under Correa followed Chávez path with the support of social movements. Since 2002, indige-
nous social movements from the lowlands of Bolivia demanded a constituent assembly as the mechanism to 
radically reform the state and to include indigenous peoples and their cultures (Postero 2015: 404-405). Ec-
uadorian social movements and the left were dissatisfied with the Constituent Assembly of 1997, which they 
perceived as exclusionary and dominated by traditional rightwing parties. Despite the inclusion of indige-
nous and Afro-Ecuadorean collective rights, and the transformation of the national identity from mestizo to 
multicultural, the indigenous and other social movements branded the Constitution of 1998 as neoliberal. 
They demanded a new constituent assembly that would be truly participatory.  
Left-wing populists emerged as a result of widespread popular resistance to neoliberalism. On 27 February 
1989, the Venezuelan Caracazo, a massive insurrection against a hike in the price of gasoline that was brutal-
ly repressed with at least 400 people killed, undermined and ultimately destroyed the legitimacy of Venezue-
la’s two-party system. The two dominant political parties, the Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Social 




Christian Party (COPEI), became perceived as closed cartel parties that monopolized the political arena and 
whose policies led to economic decline and impoverishment of the middle and working classes (López Maya 
and Panzarelli 2013). Between 1997 and 2005, the three elected presidents of Ecuador could not finish their 
terms in office. Popular protest against neoliberalism and corruption allowed Congress to oust them using the 
law instrumentally. For example, Congress claimed that president Abdalá Bucaram was crazy and unfit to 
govern without medical proofs of his alleged insanity. Jamil Mahuad and Lucio Gutierrez were removed by 
Congress with the false allegation that they had abandoned office (de la Torre 2010: 177-180). Bolivia un-
derwent a cycle of protest and political turmoil that resulted in the collapse of both the party system estab-
lished in 1985 and the neoliberal economic model in the country. Coalitions of rural and urban indigenous 
organizations, coca growers, and middleclass sectors fought against water privatization, increasing taxation, 
the forced eradication of coca leaves, and surrendering gas reserves to multinational interests. The state in-
creasingly relied on repression, which in turn radicalized protestors (de la Torre 2010).  
A second factor in the rise of left-wing populism was the perception that politicians and neoliberal elites 
had surrendered national sovereignty to the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. government. For example, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, Venezuela became an advocate of U.S.-sponsored policies of neoliberal reform and 
free trade in the Americas. In a desperate move to stop hyperinflation in 2000, Ecuador gave up its national 
currency, the Sucre, for the U.S. dollar, as President Jamil Mahuad’s administration compromised national 
sovereignty by allowing the United States to establish a military base to monitor illegal immigration and 
drug trafficking in Ecuador. Bolivia underwent social strife and human rights abuses as the military unsuc-
cessfully followed U.S. policies of military eradication of coca leaf production.  
As a consequence, these nations underwent major crises of political representation regarding the legitima-
cy of democratic institutions. Political parties were perceived as instruments of local and foreign elites that 
implemented neoliberal policies and thereby increased social inequality. Traditional parties collapsed as po-
litical outsiders rose to power on platforms that promised to eliminate corrupt politicians, experiment with 
participatory forms of democracy, and implement policies to redistribute wealth. 
The main innovation of left-wing populists was their appeal to the re-foundational role of constituent 
power. Constitution-making became the utopia for the construction of a more participatory and equal society, 
and the main strategy to change the institutional framework of society. The processes to draft the new consti-
tutions in these nations were participatory and involved social movements. Yet, they diverged in the mecha-
nisms used to summon their constituent assemblies. The Bolivian congress followed the existing constitution 
and enacted a special law to convene a constitutional assembly in 2006. Correa followed Venezuela’s model 
of using a referendum to authorize whether or not to convene a constitutional assembly. As in Venezuela, the 
reasoning was that even though the existing constitution did not allow for such a mechanism, the people’s 
constituent power had primacy over constituted power. In Venezuela, a Supreme Court ruling allowed for 
calling the referendum. In Ecuador, Congress, which was controlled by traditional parties and lacked a single 
representative of Correa’s movement, threatened to halt the proposed referendum. After securing key institu-
tional support from the Electoral Tribunal Board (TSE) and the Constitutional Tribunal (TC), Correa man-
aged to push his project through, disqualifying 57 legislators opposed to the unconstitutional mechanism 
used to call for an assembly (de la Torre and Ortiz 2016).  
The Bolivian constituent assembly, where Evo Morales’s coalition had a majority, coexisted with opposi-
tion political parties that controlled congress, and a powerful regionalist movement in the lowlands (Burbano 
de Lara 2014). Morales’s coalition was forced to negotiate the content of the constitution. Moreover, strong 
social movements forced him to negotiate policies. By contrast, in Venezuela and Ecuador charismatic presi-
dents controlled the processes for elaborating new charters. Although the Venezuelan national assembly did 





not close congress, it substantially diminished its power and intervened in the judicial system (Combellas 
2010: 155). Correa and his supporters radicalized Chávez’s example of controlling the constituent process: 
the Ecuadorean assembly sent the recently elected congress into a recess and arbitrarily assumed all legisla-
tive powers.   
The new constitutions were approved in referenda. These constitutions had a structural tension between 
the expansion of social, economic, cultural, and multicultural rights, and “power structures that are political-
ly concentrated and territorially centralized” (Gargarella 2017: 222). A different kind of democracy based on 
elections, but also on a new institutional order that concentrates power in the hands of the president and the 
executive branch was established. Majoritarian mobilization led by a personalistic leader took precedence 
over the checks and balances and respect for basic civil rights inherent in liberal democracy. Mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability by other branches of government and an independent press were replaced by a vari-
ant of vertical accountability involving frequent elections, referenda, and plebiscites. 
A second innovation of radical populist presidents was their use of discriminatory legalism to punish crit-
ics while performing an appearance of legality. In the past populist presidents did not have qualms about not 
respecting laws and institutional procedures to regulate the media or civil society. Perón for example closed 
newspapers, and replaced the leadership of worker’s unions with cronies, while jailing those who did not ac-
cepted to be coopted. The novelty of Chávez, Correa and Morales was to use the legal system to punish crit-
ics with an aura of lawfulness (Weyland 2013).  
In order to use laws discretionarily, populist presidents packed the courts and institutions of accountability 
with loyal followers hence getting rid of the institutional mechanisms for horizontal accountability. After 
drafting the new constitution, the Venezuelan Assembly created a transitory council that governed legislative 
affairs between the approval of the constitution in December 1999 and the election of the new congress in 
August 2000. By controlling this council, Chávez put trustworthy authorities in charge of the National Elec-
toral Council. In 2004, Chávez put the highest judicial authority, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, in the 
hands of loyal judges. By 2006, hundreds of lower court judges were fired and replaced by unconditional 
supporters (Hawkins 2016). Correa followed Chávez’s model of convening a transitory council after the as-
sembly drafted the new constitution. The “congresillo” was tasked with naming the new judicial authorities 
and the people in charge of the institutions of accountability, such as the ombudsman and the controller. In 
2011, Correa created an ad hoc Consejo de la Judicatura charged with appointing the members of the Na-
tional Court, the highest judicial authority. Gustavo Jalkh, who was Correa’s personal secretary, was named 
head of the Consejo. Similarly, Morales gained control of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Between 2006 
and 2009, his administration dismantled the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal, gaining control 
of the courts after 2010.  
Populists argued that the private media acted as an opposition political party. Morales, for example, on 
several occasions said that the media was his “number one enemy.” Control and regulation of the media by 
the state was at the center of the populist struggle for hegemony. Chávez led the path in enacting laws to con-
trol the privately-owned media. In 2000, the Organic Law of Telecommunication allowed the government to 
suspend or revoke broadcasting concessions to private outlets when it was “convenient for the interest of the 
nation.” The Law of Social Responsibility of 2004 banned “the broadcasting of material that could promote 
hatred and violence” (Corrales 2015: 39). These laws were ambiguous, and the government could interpret 
their content according to its interests. Correa’s government emulated Chávez. In 2013, the National Assem-
bly controlled by his party approved a communication law that created a state institution tasked with moni-




toring and regulating the content of what the media could publish. In Bolivia, a well-intentioned yet vaguely 
drafted law against racial discrimination in the media was used to intimidate the private media. 
To challenge the power of the private media, Chávez’s government took away radio and television fre-
quencies from critics. The state became the main communicator, controlling 64% of television channels. 
Correa created a state media conglomerate, and under Morales 90 percent of the media was under his control 
(Archondo 2020: 250). Chávez and Correa suffocated the private media by reducing government advertise-
ments on critical media venues and by manipulating the subsidies for the price of paper. They used discrimi-
natory legalism to intimidate and harass journalists and private media owners. Correa sued the owners of 
newspapers and journalists who uncovered cases of corruption or were critical to his administration. The 
most notorious cases that were reported worldwide involved an editor and three board members of the largest 
privately-owned newspaper, El Universo, who were convicted of defamation and sentenced to three-year 
terms for publishing an editorial entitled, “No to Lies”; the paper was also fined US$40 million. Subsequent-
ly, president Correa pardoned them (de la Torre and Ortiz 2016).  
In addition, leftwing populist enacted legislation that used ambiguous language to control and regulate the 
work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 2010, the Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty 
and National Self-Determination in Venezuela barred non-governmental organizations that defended politi-
cal rights or monitored the performance of public bodies from receiving international assistance (Corrales 
2015: 39). Three years later, in 2013, Correa enacted Executive Decree 16. This decree gave the government 
authority to sanction NGOs for deviating from the objectives for which they were constituted, for engaging 
in politics, and for interfering in public policies in a way that contravenes internal and external security or 
disturbs public peace. To set an example, the teacher’s union and the environmental organization Pachama 
Alliance were closed for deviating from the original organization’s goals, and for interfering with public pol-
icy and security. Morales followed suit by passing legislation in 2013 to revoke an organization’s permit to 
operate if it performs activities different from those listed in its statutes, or if the organization’s representa-
tive is criminally sanctioned for carrying out activities that undermine security or public order.  
In Bolivia and Ecuador, the right to participate was restricted to groups that were recognized and author-
ized by the state. In Venezuela and Ecuador, social movements were created from the top down to counteract 
the power of workers’ unions, unionized teachers, students and indigenous groups. At the same time, these 
organizations distributed resources to loyal followers that promoted the interest of their governments. Protest 
was criminalized in these nations. Union leaders and striking workers, even when they were sympathizers of 
Chávez, were charged with terrorism. Hundreds of peasant and indigenous activists were accused of terror-
ism and sabotage in Ecuador. Laws were used discretionally to arrest and harass leading figures of the oppo-
sition in these nations. 
In sum, Chávez, Correa, and Morales forged populist regimes. At the institutional level, power was con-
centrated in the presidency reducing the power of congress and of institutions of horizontal accountability 
such as the ombudsman, the general prosecutor, and the controller. Populist regimes combine the democratic 
logic of elections with anti-pluralist practices based on the notion of the ‘people as one’, and views of the 
leader as the people’s savior. Even though elections give legitimacy, populists cannot conceive that the peo-
ple could vote for any other candidate but for them: the true representatives of the people (Ochoa Espejo 
2014). When populists do not win elections, they cry electoral fraud. When in power, populists hold elec-
tions but make it difficult for the opposition to participate in a level playing field. They used the legal system 
to restrict rights of free association and expression. The people are not constructed as a pluralistic population, 
but as a single entity with one will and interest, which corresponds with the one articulated by the leader. The 
unity of the people is achieved with a logic of antagonistic confrontation against an enemy. Inclusion and 





protection are given on the condition of subordination to the leader. The leader is transformed into a charis-
matic redeemer tasked with the mission of liberating the people. 
 
 
4. In the Name of Democracy 
 
The polarizing logic of populism often led the opposition to use any means necessary to get rid of popu-
lists. As we will show using the 2002 coup attempt against Chávez and the 2019 coup d'état against Morales, 
populists and their adversaries often appealed to democracy to justify undemocratic practices. During the 
first years of Chávez’s administration Venezuelans participated in massive demonstrations either in support 
of or against him. The hegemonic struggle was articulated around the term “democracy” (Cannon 2004: 
294). Chávez was represented as the essence or the denial of the democratic ideal. For his supporters, Chávez 
had protected the nation from a privileged few, and was carrying out a project to bring social justice. For the 
opposition he was an autocrat who had concentrated power threatening the wellbeing of the nation with ill-
fated policies especially on petroleum.  
A coalition of business, labor, and civil society organizations, with the active support of the privately-
owned media, took to the streets to protest against what they perceived as the undermining of democracy. 
They focused on changes to the educational law, agrarian reform, and the dismissal of technical personnel in 
the state petroleum company PDVSA and their replacement with Chávez’s loyalists. April 11, 2002 hun-
dreds of thousands took the streets of Caracas to protest the changes of top managers in the state petroleum 
company. Labor leader Carlos Ortega urged the crowd to go to the presidential palace to “oust Chávez”. 
They marched for about seven miles to the seat of government at the Miraflores Palace chanting, “The peo-
ple united will never be defeated”. On their way more people joined in. “The extraordinary size of the march 
strengthened the opposition’s perception that the whole country was with them and that history was in their 
side” (Coronil 2011: 35).  
The television showed images of Chávez’s loyalist firing upon the crowd. 19 people died, and even though 
it was later shown that those images were fabricated by the media, the general perception at that time was 
that the president was repressing the people. The massive protests against Chávez, and the manufactured im-
ages of chavistas firing at demonstrators were used as a pretext to give a coup. Arguing a power vacuum and 
that Chávez had abandoned power, Pedro Carmona took power with the support of the high military officers 
and the U.S. and Spanish governments. He dismissed all elected officials of Chávez’s regime, and named 
conservatives as ministers without including other members of the anti-Chávez coalition. He changed the 
name of Venezuela back to its original name, symbolically abolishing all of the legacies of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
Chávez’s followers organized in the Bolivarian Circles, urban land committees, and other associations had 
responded to the opposition’s protests with counter demonstrations. After knowing that Chávez was over-
thrown thousand marched risking their lives demanding to see their leader. Popular protest led to Chávez’s 
triumphant return to power Sunday April 14. He became the embodiment of the democratic ideal, and a fig-
ure larger than life who overcame a coup d'état. 
Shortly after the events, the National Assembly as congress is named in Venezuela could not agree on one 
account of these episodes. For the opposition it was a “constitutional rebellion”. They argued, 
Only Chávez was to blame for the situation, as he had created a context of ungovernability due to his re-
peated infringements of the Constitution… The huge march on April 11 was peaceful, unarmed, and hence 




was not insurrectional, as the government maintained…The President had permitted and/or ordered the Boli-
varian Circles, Armed Forces, and the National Guard to open fire on the demonstration, and hence he was 
the only person responsible for their deaths. This left the Armed Forces no choice but to defend the Venezue-
lan people by seeking the president’s resignation in support of the civic insurrection (Cannon 2004: 295).  
The government and its supporters labeled it as a coup d'état. They argued that the opposition was respon-
sible for the deaths. The march of the opposition “became insurrectional when it changed its route to the 
Presidential Palace of Miraflores… The events could only be termed a coup as they were planned conspirato-
rially with sectors of the military, business, opposition, and media involved” (Ibid.). Chávez subsequently 
adopted 21 Century Socialism as a new model of direct democracy, and of state-led development. It took 
several years for the opposition to use democratic means like elections to unsuccessfully try to replace Chá-
vez and Maduro.  
The Bolivian constitution approved under Morales limited the reelection of the president and vice-
president to two terms. In 2016 Morales lost a referendum to change the constitution to allow for his reelec-
tion. In 2017 the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that Morales could run because according to international law 
that has priority over domestic law no person could be banned from his human right to run for office. The 
opposition took the streets to protest against what they considered to be Morales’ manipulation of the system 
of justice to remain in power illegally (Paz Gonzales 2020: 233). Elections were held on October 2019, and 
the counting of votes was abruptly interrupted. Hours later Morales was proclaimed as the winner.  
After 21 days of protest Morales resigned and left to exile in Mexico. Protesters were mostly of middle 
class and urban origin, yet some organizations of coca growers that were marginalized by Morales and even 
the Bolivian Central Workers Union COB asked for his resignation in order to bring peace. Morales had to 
leave office because the police rebelled and stop controlling demonstrators, and the armed forces suggested 
Morales to step down. Whereas the opposition argued that their movement was a democratic resistance to 
electoral fraud, Morales and his followers argued that it was a coup.  
The opposition is correct in arguing that Morales bended laws to try to stay in power beyond clearly estab-
lished term limits. Even though Morales started his government with the Zapatista motto of ruling by obey-
ing the Bolivian people, over time his government became personalistic. The leadership of his movement ar-
gued that he was indispensable to assure the continuity of the process of change and hence needed to be re-
elected (Tórrez and Lascano 2020: 269). Morales had ruled for 13 years, longer than any other siting presi-
dent of Bolivia. According to the opposition he was in control of two thirds of congress, the system of jus-
tice, and the media (Archondo 2020: 250). 
Morales is also right in charging a coup d'état as the police stop obeying the president, and the military 
asked him to step down. Yet instead of taking power the military allowed civilians to follow constitutional 
procedures to replace Morales. Because the legislators of Morales party did not attend the session of Con-
gress tasked to name a replacement, senator Jeanine Añez was elected temporary president with the task of 
calling for new elections. She assumed the presidency holding a bible, and some politicians of the opposition 
desecrated the whipala, the indigenous flag symbol of purinational Bolivia made up of several nationalities. 
They vowed to free Bolivia from Indian paganism. Morales’s followers took to the streets to reject Añez and 
to defend the conquest of plurinationality. They were repressed and at least 36 people were killed in the city 
of El Alto and thousands were arbitrarily arrested (Torréz and Lascano 2020: 271). President Añez and the 
media stigmatized Morales followers as uncivilized hordes, profoundly different from the citizens that had 
resisted electoral fraud. Morales followers were also depicted as narcotraffickers because many are coca 
growers. Añez’s government used laws instrumentally to persecute top leaders of the MAS and former gov-
ernment officials. Evo Morales was accused of terrorism and treason. 





These murky events illustrate how under conditions of polarization and when politics becomes a zero-sum 
game, actors in Bolivia used all means available to stay or to conquer power. Morales actions systematically 
undermined democracy, and he tried to stay in power although he had lost a referendum. At the end he was 
toppled. Añez’s provisional government is overstepping its responsibility to call for new elections attempting 
to stop Morales from ever returning to office. In Venezuela Chávez and his followers where the ones that de-
fended democracy from a coup. Yet he had systematically excluded the opposition ruling by majoritarianism 
and some of his policies were of dubious legality. Hence people demonstrating against Chávez claimed that 
they were defending democracy and were not aware of Carmona’s plot to destroy democracy. Under condi-
tions of profound polarization and institutional weakness political change took the form of breakdown and 
replacement. Populist took over the courts and institutions of accountability to displace and control the oppo-
sition. Without legal institutional channels the opposition used destabilization. When they were successful in 
overthrowing the populist as in Bolivia, anti-populist forces used laws instrumentally to cast the populist 
leader and his coalition as outsiders to the rule of law. Morales and his followers who are for the most part 
indigenous were labeled as hordes and drug traffickers. 
 
 
5. The Aftermath of a Democratic Populist Succession 
 
Whereas allegations of electoral fraud and violations to the Constitution led to Evo Morales’ dramatic 
overthrow and exile, elite fights and rivalries within Correa’s political movement Alianza País provoked the 
transition to post-populism in Ecuador (Burbano and de la Torre 2020). Rafael Correa (2007-2017) made 
sure that his party ticket made up of his trusted former vice presidents Lenín Moreno and Jorge Glass won 
the elections in 2017. Yet Moreno abandoned a populist language and entered into dialogue with Correa’s 
enemies with the aim of re-institutionalizing democracy.  
Correa and his close collaborators were charged on accounts of corruption or abuse of power. Vice presi-
dent Jorge Glass is in jail for taking US$ 13.5 millions in bribes from the construction firm Odebrecht. Cor-
rea who is living in Brussels could go to prison if he sets foot in Ecuador with charges of abuse of power in 
the failed kidnapping attempt of an oppositional politician and for using public funds and money from Ode-
brecht and other private firms for his party’s campaign.  
After breaking with Correa, Moreno promised to re-establish democracy and to dismantle Correa’s hold 
over institutions of justice and accountability. In February 2018, Moreno won a referendum to amend the 
constitution with 67 percent of the vote. Citizens were asked to abolish Correa’s constitutional reform of 
2015 that allowed for permanent re-election. The original limit of two terms was reinstated, meaning that 
Correa would never again ascend to the presidency. In a second major result, voters agreed to cease the exist-
ing Council of Citizens’ Participation and Social Control (CCPSC) and to name a temporary and transitional 
council. According to the Constitution, the CPCCS was tasked to name the ombudsman, the attorney general, 
the electoral council, the judiciary council, and other key authorities in charge of horizontal accountability.  
The temporary CCPSC claimed to operate under conditions of exceptionality, with a mandate given to 
them by means of a consultation that expressed the will of the people. Therefore, the council could act above 
the rule of law, as, for instance, when the previous council was terminated without following the existing 
procedures which indicate that the members of the council serve for five years and could only be censored by 
the legislative. The council evaluated, ceased, and replaced 28 high-ranking officials designated by the Cor-
rea administration and loyal to the former president. The council overstepped its powers. Even though the 




constitutional court was not included among the bodies that fall under the purview of the CCPSC, the nine 
constitutional-court judges, three of whom were investigated for money laundering, were removed.  
Moreno’s strategy of using a popular consultation had the advantage of allowing for rapid institutional 
change to expel Correa’s loyalists from the system of justice and accountability. Yet the danger is that trans-
formations might last only as long as the political conjuncture favors Moreno. Hence, institutional changes 
could be reversed if there are changes in the perception of Correa’s image. The former president still has 
about 20 percent of popular support, and differently from Moreno who had to reduce social spending and to 
shrink the size of the state, he ruled under an economic bonanza. Moreno was almost overthrown in October 
2019 when he raised the price of gasoline in order to comply with the IMF conditions for bailout loans. In-
stead of solving political instability, consultations made in the name of the unitary will of the people create 
uncertainty and arbitrariness in the political game. The voice of the people and the popularity of presidents 






This article has demonstrated that, whereas when seeking office populist promise to improve democracy, 
their practices in power are more ambiguous as they include the excluded on the condition of loyalty to the 
leader. The logic of populism transforms politics into an antagonistic confrontation between friends and en-
emies politicizing almost all social and political spheres and reducing institutional democratic spaces to the 
opposition. Without institutional spaces, political and economic elites had resisted populism by all means in-
cluding coups d'état. When they did not call the military to solve civilian problems, they instrumentally used 
laws to stop populists from ever coming back to office. Populists and their opponents invoked the term de-
mocracy to often justify unconstitutional actions. Therefore, one can seriously question whether populists or 
their rivals can be seen as pristine “democrats”. It is more fruitful to explore their actions in particular histor-
ical conjunctures when the meanings of democracy were at stake. 
We have argued that under populist regimes in Latin America political and social rights have had priority 
over civil rights. Classical populists like Perón enlarged the franchise and used the vote to bestow legitimacy 
onto their presidencies but restricting the rights of his opponents. His followers obtained political and social 
rights, whereas civil rights were given on the condition of loyalty to the leader. The populist logic of polari-
zation provoked the antagonist struggle between two camps. In their zeal to exclude their enemies, populists 
used laws to punish critics and to limit their rights. After removing the populist coalition their rivals also 
twisted laws to try to stop the populists from returning to office and to erase their legacies. Democracy hence 
became a very conflictive game and the history of Latin America was marked by the cycles of populism-
liberal democracy-military regime. 
At the turn of the twenty first century radical populists invoked the unitary will of the people to convene 
constituent assemblies to enact change. In the name of the people, plebiscitarian democracies were created. 
Even though rights were expanded, power was concentrated in the executive and in the central administra-
tion, accountability was reduced, and the rights of association and information were curtailed. The logic of 
antagonism between friend and enemy transformed politics into existentialist struggles between two camps, 
forcing bystanders to choose sides. These nations lived process of democratic erosion, yet the outcomes of 
populism were different. 





Under Maduro Venezuela became a tyranny. After losing congress to the opposition, Maduro took away 
powers from the legislature, called for elections for a new constituent assembly, and used brutal repression 
against the opposition (López Maya 2018). Morales was overthrown after massive mobilizations against his 
attempt to stay in power indefinitely. In Ecuador the transition to post populism had an aura of legality.  
Moreno called for a consultation arguing that it expressed the unitary will of the people to clean the state 
from Correa’s cronies. Unfortunately, instead of strengthening institutions and the rule of law, their actions 
contribute to uncertainty and arbitrariness, jeopardizing their efforts to reconstitute democratic institutions 
and coexistence.   
Political confrontations between two antagonist camps weakened pluralism, constrained free and open de-
bates in the public sphere, and led to institutional weakness. Under these conditions, institutions cannot ef-
fectively shape behavior, but are commonly disrespected with impunity; if enforcement is lax and actors 
simply fail to follow the official rules, formal institutions lack relevance. Second, institutional weakness also 
prevails where institutions can be changed at will. Malleable institutions do not constrain current power 
holders; instead, they turn into instruments that incumbents can use to pursue their goals, including the con-
centration of power and curtailment of the opposition. The law then serves not as essential scaffolding of 
democracy, but as a building block for authoritarianism (Weyland 2020: 392).  
Under populist polarization it is difficult to forge strong institutions that last over time and whose rules are 
obeyed at the risk of sanctions (Levitsky and Murillo 2009: 123). Hence, it is important to differentiate popu-
list inclusion from democratization. Whereas Latin American populists often included the politically, eco-
nomically and culturally excluded, they do not guarantee that institutions would work to recognize political 
and civil rights for all the population. Populist inclusion was giving on the condition of surrendering to the 
leader and any divergence could transform critics, even former travelers, into enemies of the leader, the peo-
ple, and the nation. The leader was constructed and acted as the embodiment of the unitary people and was 
unbounded by formal procedures including constitutional provisions.  
Differentiating inclusion for democratization allows to correct two common misconceptions about the re-
lationship between populism and democracy. The first is the empiricist assertion that populism could be the 
friend or foe of democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Our review of the most inclusionary types 
of populism such as Peronism or Chavismo illustrated that they were inclusionary but not democratic. The 
second is based on the two strands theory of democracy that argues that liberal democracy is the result of the 
historical conjunction of the liberal component that protects rights, and the democratic side based on equality 
and popular sovereignty (Mouffe 2018: 14). Perón and Chávez according to this interpretation could be label 
as promoting an anti-liberal path of democratization.  
We disagree because without fundamental liberal freedoms, and the possibility that all citizens have to ap-
peal to the rule of law against state functionaries and elites there is no democracy. Civil liberties allow the 
self-organization of people in civil society and protect the public sphere from interference by the govern-
ment, while treating all persons as equals under the law. Without rights that safeguard the independence of 
civil society and the public sphere democracy could not flourish. Under populism open debates among citi-
zens protected by the rule of law are replaced with the idea that the leader is the mouth and the voice of the 
authentic people, “opinions and decisions that counter the populist people are constantly chastised, mocked, 
and rejected as a conspiracy among elites” (Urbinati 2019: 168).  
Recognizing the importance of liberal freedoms is not the same as having a static view of democracy. As 
O’Donnell (1999) argued democracy is a moving horizon and an unfinished project that depends in great part 
on the freedoms and rights that citizens have to collectively deliberate in the public sphere and to form or-




ganizations in civil society. Populism provokes a catastrophic stalemate between two antagonistic camps. It 
could only be resolved if one side --either the populists or its enemies-- defeat the other. Historically both 
forces have been unable to permanently defeat each other, and hence those temporarily defeated have be-
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